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III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Miller and Kimball's Brief asks this Court to review this
appeal through only two bodies of law; the finality of Default
Judgments and the Doctrine of Merger, neither of which addresses
this case's unique circumstances.
foreclosure is based upon

Martineau's objection to the

(1) Miller and Kimball's

independent

contractual obligation, assumed by Miller and Kimball after the
Default Judgment, to honor Martineau's Lease and (2) the improper
use of the foreclosure process to foreclose Martineau's Lease,
without the genuine purpose of satisfying a lien or debt.

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT DID NOT ADDRESS, OR DISPOSE OF, THE
ISSUES RAISED BY MARTINEAU'S MOTIONS. THEREFORE, RULE 60(b)IS
NOT THE PROPER CONTEXT IN WHICH TO RESOLVE MARTINEAU'S
MOTIONS.
1.

The Default Judgment Did Not Constitute a Judgment on
Miller and Kimball's Subsequent Lease Assumption.

Miller and Kimball contend that Martineau has no standing to
object to the foreclosure unless the Default Judgment is first set
aside.
ruling,

Miller

and Kimball's

incorrectly

overlook

argument, and
the limited

the

trial

court's

scope of the

Default

Judgment and the new and independent issues raised by Martineau.

1

Judge Noel entered Default Judgment on March 5, 1993 in favor
of Republic Capitol Bank, declaring that Martineaufs
interest

"is inferior,

junior

and

subordinate

leasehold

to the

lien

of

[Republic]". (R. 473) The Court did not then extinguish Martineaufs
interest.

Rather, the leasehold remained until extinguished and

terminated "upon the execution sale of the property".

(R. 474)

There was no order in place preventing a new landlord from assuming
the Martineau lease or entering into new contractual covenants not
to terminate Martineaufs lease.

That is precisely what Miller and

Kimball did.
After the Default Judgment, but before Martineaufs interest
was extinguished at a foreclosure sale, Miller and Kimball made
contractual covenants to honor the still viable Martineau Lease.
Miller and Kimball

contracted, in an Assignment of Leases "(a) to

observe and perform all obligations imposed upon Lessor under the
leases." [Paragraph 2.] (R.1165, Addendum 9 Page 1 ) .
lease

provisions

addresses

Miller

assumed
and

by

Miller

Kimball's

and

Kimball

obligation

in

One of the
specifically

the

foreclosure;
So long as Lessee is not in default under the
terms of this lease, however, this lease shall
remain in full force and effect for the full
term hereof and shall not be terminated as a
result of any foreclosure (or transfer in lieu
thereof) of such mortgage or other security
instrument to which Lessee has subordinated
its rights pursuant to this subparagraph.
(R.ll
65,
Addendum
2,
Paragraph
33).
(emphasis added.)
2

event

of

These contractual obligations had not been assumed by Miller
and Kimball when the Default was entered.
interests had not yet been extinguished.

Moreover, Martineaufs

Therefore, Martineau had

standing to raise new objections to the foreclosure which were not
inconsistent with the prior ruling regarding Republic!s priority.
Therefore the Motion to Set Aside the Default is irrelevant to
Martineau!s objections and other motions.
2.

The Default Judgment Did Not Constitute a Judgment on the
Effect of Miller and Kimballfs Subsequent Release of the
1986 Trust Deed or the Propriety of Miller and Kimball's
Use of Foreclosure Proceedings under the Newly Created
Debt Circumstances.

Another reason that the Default Judgment is not the proper
context to address this case is that the Default Judgment did not
address the issue of whether Miller and Kimball, who were not even
parties to the Default Judgment, could foreclose on a forgiven debt
for a purpose other than satisfying a lien or debt.
The debt

on the

1986 Trust

Deed was

forgiven, after

the

Default Judgment. (R.1165, Addendum 4 p.12). The Default Judgment
did not address the question of whether a foreclosure sale should
proceed on the basis of the 1986 Trust Deed, after that debt was
forgiven and for a purpose unrelated to that debt.

Therefore, the

trial court erred when it relied upon the Default Judgment.
The legal issue overlooked or ignored by the trial court and
by Miller and Kimball is the following:

3

If Republic's attorneys had drafted the original Complaint to
proclaim that Martineaufs interest ceased as of the moment of any
judgment

and

foreclosure

that

Martineau

had

no

further

abuses or rights with respect

property, Martineau could have
form of a resulting judgment.

protections

from

to the sale of the

(and would have) objected to the

However, the Complaint only alleged

and the Default Judgment only declared that Martineau!s interest
was inferior and that, upon sale, Martineau*s
terminated.

Unfortunately,

the

trial

rights would be

court

misread

and

misinterpreted the Default Judgment as declaring that Martineau!s
interest were terminated and that Martineaufs rights to address the
court regarding the sale were terminated as of the date of the
default, rather than as of the date of the sale.

Miller and

Kimball ask this court to make the same error.
The trial court should have recognized that Martineau raised
rights

and

objections

to

the

foreclosure

sale

which

stood

independent of and subsequent to the Default Judgment and which
were not inconsistent with the Default Judgment.

The Default

Judgment, whether set aside or not, is not a judgment on the issues
raised by Martineaufs motion in enjoin the foreclosure sale.
B.

EVEN IF THE JUDGMENT DEFAULT IS RELEVANT, THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MARTINEAUTS MOTION TO SET THE
JUDGMENT ASIDE.
If the Default Judgment is relevant to the issues

raised

before the trial court, the trial court abused its discretion by
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(1) incorrectly assuming Martineau could have raised its objections
(18) months earlier (before the grounds for Martineau1s

eighteen

objections had arisen) and

(2) failing to recognize Martineau1 s

good

regarding

faith

interpretation

the

limited

scope

of

the

Default Judgment.
Miller and Kimball rely heavily on the trial court's finding
that there was an eighteen

(18) month delay between the Default

Judgment and the Motion to set the Default Judgment aside.

This

reliance upon eighteen (18) months illustrates the trial court's
mistake.

Eighteen (18) months before Martineau moved to set the

judgment aside, Miller and Kimball had not contracted to honor
leases and had not released Associates from the 1986 Trust Deed.
Under the grounds asserted by Martineau, Rule 60(b) requires action
within

a

"reasonable

time".

It

is

patently

unreasonable

(impossible) to expect a motion to be filed before the events
underlying the motion have transpired.

As explained in Martineau's

opening brief, Martineau immediately filed its motion to dismiss
when it learned the terms of the Miller and Kimball transaction.
The Default Judgment's conclusion that Republic's interest had
priority was not relevant to the new circumstances.

At the time of

the Motion to Dismiss, there was a new Plaintiff, a new agreement
and the debt underlying the 1986 Trust Deed had been forgiven.
Accordingly, there was no unreasonable delay.

At the very least,

Martineau's interpretation of the meaning of the Default Judgment

5

was a sufficiently reasonable basis for the court to set aside that
judgment and address the case on its merits.
Martineau still does not dispute Republic's priority under the
circumstances existing at the time of the Default Judgment.

It is

not the Court's conclusion at the time of the Default Judgment with
which Martineau disagrees.

Accordingly, Martineau had no reason to

ask the Court to set that judgment aside until Miller and Kimball
asked the trial court to treat the Default Judgment as a ruling
regarding

circumstances

which

the

Default

Judgment

had

not

entertained.
C.

MILLER AND KIMBALL FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING THAT
THEY ARE NOT BOUND BY THE LEASE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE RECORD
SHOWS THEY ASSUMED.
Miller and Kimball briefly acknowledge Martineaufs allegations

regarding Miller and Kimball's lease covenants.
Page 33)

(Appellee's Brief,

Miller and Kimball change the subject by stating "What

Martineau is really arguing is that the trial court allegedly erred
in concluding that the merger doctrine did not apply."

Id.

To the

contrary, what Martineau is really arguing is that, regardless of
whether Miller and Kimball's legal title merged with the lien,
Miller and Kimball contracted not to terminate the lease.

Nowhere

do Miller and Kimball refute these contractual terms or that they
were assumed by Miller and Kimball.

The Lessor's covenant, adopted

in the Assignment of Leases and in the new Trust Deed assumes that
there is no merger.

Yet it provides that:

6

So long Lessee is not in default under the
terms of the lease, however, this lease shall
remain in full force and effect for the full
term hereof and shall not be terminated as a
result of any foreclosure (or transfer in lieu
thereof) of such mortgage or other security
instrument to which Lessee has subordinated
its rights pursuant to this subparagraph. (R.
1165 Addendum 2, Paragraph 33.) (emphasis
added.)
By its own terms, the above provision protects Martineau even
if there is no merger and the foreclosure is otherwise proper.
Miller

and Kimball

fail to adequately

refute

this

contractual

obligation.
As Miller and Kimball address their contractual promises by
relying on case law regarding merger, it should be noted that those
cases do not address similar contractual commitments by foreclosing
parties. For example, Miller and Kimball rely upon Federal Land
Bank of Wichita v. Colorado National Bank of Denver, 786 P.2d 514
(Colo. App. 1989) . In Federal Land Bank, a mortgagor, gave a Trust
Deed to a mortgagee, in lieu of foreclosure.

Colorado National

Bank contended that its junior lien was not extinguished on the
basis of the merger doctrine.

Miller and Kimball correctly note

that the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the merger on the basis
of the mortgagee's intent.

However, Federal Land Bank did not

agree to take the Deed in lieu of foreclosure subject to the lien
of Colorado National Bank.

The Court was not faced with a promise

by the foreclosing company to honor the inferior interest.

7

In contrast, Miller and Kimball contracted to be bound by the
terms of the lease.

O'Reilly v. McLean, et al.. 37 P.2d 770 (Utah

1934) is similarly distinguishable. There, the Defendant claimed
that the Plaintiff could not proceed with her foreclosure because
her equitable title and her mortgage had merged.

The Utah Supreme

Court rejected the argument on the basis of intention inconsistent
with a merger.

Again, the foreclosing mortgage holder did not take

title concurrent with a promise to recognize and honor the rights
of an inferior interest holder.

Miller and Kimball did purchase

their interest subject to such a promise to Martineau.

Miller and

Kimball cannot deny a contractual promise to honor interests
the Lessees.

of

This shifts the burden to them to find a legal basis

for making those contractual obligations invalid.
basis has been suggested.

No such legal

The absence of merger falls short of a

reason to breach their contractual obligations.
D.

PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY PROHIBIT MILLER AND KIMBALL FROM USING A
FORECLOSURE FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE.
1.

Miller and Kimballfs
Foreclosure Remedy.

Miller

and

Kimball

Foreclosure

purchased

the

Is a Misuse

property

for

of the

$750,000,

creating a new Trust Deed in the amount of $550,000 (R. 1116-17).
Because Miller and Kimball already owned the Judge Building which
they

were

foreclosure

foreclosing,
was

to

the

terminate

existing tenant's lease).

sole

remaining

Martineaufs

purpose

Lease

of

(and no

the
other

By subordinating the new Trust Deed to

8

the 1986 Trust Deed, any interested buyer at the foreclosure sale
would now have to bid $2,200,000 and would still be subject to
Lender's new Trust Deed of $550,000.
Kimball

were

foreclosing

against

Essentially, Miller and

themselves

to

terminate

one

selected lease in the Judge Building, having previously released
the original obligor of the 1986 Trust Deed (Associates) from any
further liability.

(R. 1165, Addendum No. 4, p. 12). There was no

obligation to pay the original debt of 2.3 million dollars to
Republic, but Miller and Kimball proceeded toward a Sherifffs sale
although the mortgage underlying the foreclosure would have no
bearing

on any exchange of money or any payment of any debt.

Although the purpose of a foreclosure sale is to pay a debt, this
foreclosure

sale

was

structured

to

discourage

bidders

at

the

Sheriff's sale and only to terminate one selected lease which the
foreclosure company had covenanted to honor.
A

judicially

everyone's rights.

supervised

foreclosure

sale

should

protect

A foreclosure designed to discourage bidders

and increase the bid prize to foreclose on a released debt to
terminate a lease in conflict with the language of Miller and
Kimball's agreement is inequitable.

As part of the June 21, 1993

transaction, Associates was released from its liability to the
lender.

(R. 1165 Addendum 4 Page 12). As one treatise explained,
The debt is the principle and the mortgage is
merely incident, and the question is, not
whether the mortgage is merged, but whether
the acquisition by one person of both the
9

mortgaged land and the debt secured by the
mortgage has the effect of extinguishing or
merging the debt. If the debt is extinguished
under such circumstances, the mortgage lien is
necessarily also extinguished, while if the
debt remains, the mortgage lien also remains.
Tiffany, Law Real Property, Section 1479 Page 504.
A judicial foreclosure sale intentionally designed to

(1)

discourage bidders, (2) with an artificially high debt, (3) which
is

forgiven

and

released,

and

(4)

for

the

sole

purpose

of

terminating a lease to which the Trust Deed beneficiary is bound,
is not equitable.
2.

The body of merger law relied upon by Miller and Kimball,
arises
out
of
and
addresses
a
very
different
circumstance.

Miller and Kimball ask this Court to rely upon a line of cases
(hereinafter the "merger cases") which address a fundamentally
different circumstance than the one before this Court.

In each of

the merger cases, the court allows the foreclosure because the
foreclosing party is using the process to obtain the financial
benefits contemplated by the mortgage agreement being foreclosed.
In contrast, Miller and Kimball are not foreclosing to reduce or
pay the underlying 1986 Trust Deed or for any reason related to the
1986 Trust Deed.
Miller and Kimball's cases share the following basic pattern:
A mortgagor or interest holder deeds the mortgaged property to a
mortgagee in lieu of money owed to the mortgagee.

The mortgagee

attempts to use the foreclosure process as a way of being paid the
10

underlying debt.

A junior lienholder contends that the mortgagor's

interest and the mortgagee's interest have merged, precluding a
foreclosure sale.

The Court recognizes the separate estates in the

property in order to facilitate payment of the debt.
In

contrast,

Miller

and

Kimball

are

not

conducting

a

foreclosure sale for any purpose related to the 1986 Trust Deed.
Rather, Miller and Kimball have subordinated their own mortgage to
a 2.3 million dollar mortgage so that there will be no bid on the
building

which

will

generate money.

There

will

be

no

money

contemplated which will go to pay any debt or to be paid to any
creditor.

The sole purpose of the foreclosure in this case was to

extinguish one (of many) leases at the building.
Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Colorado National Bank of
Denver, 786 P.2d 514 (Colo. App. 1989), Altabet v. Monro Methodist
Church. 777 P.2d 544

(Wash. App. 1989), Whiteley v. Devries, et

al., 209 P.2d 206 (Utah 1949) and

Korb v. Minneapolis Threashing

Machine Company, 3 P.2d 502 (Kan. 1931) all relied upon by Miller
and Kimball as representative of the Merger Cases, basically follow
the above scenario.

Similarly, in O'Reilly v. McLean, et al. , 37

P.2d 770 (Utah 1934), the Utah Supreme Court explicitly noted that
the mortgagee which was selling the property was doing so in order
to pay a mortgage debt. O'Reilly was a mortgagee attempting to
foreclose.

O'Reilly

mortgaged property.

had

received

a Quit Claim

Deed

to the

Although the Supreme Court found that there

11

was no merger and that O'Reilly could foreclose, it was also clear
that the purpose of selling the property was to obtain payment of
a debt.
It further conclusively appears that when
Gardner
entered
into
negotiations
with
Intervener for the sale of the property. . .
the Plaintiff still was claiming under her
mortgage, for Intervener was then informed by
Gardner, that he was paying off the mortgage
and that Intervener would have to assume this
mortgage in the purchase. Later, he informed
Intervener that Plaintiff wanted her mortgage
paid rather than assumed, and Intervener
agreed to pay it.
Id. at 773.
Miller and Kimball abused the foreclosure remedy by using the
1986 Trust Deed as a pretense for the foreclosure, without serving
any purpose related to the 1986 Trust Deed.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES EXCEEDED THE SCOPE
OF RULE 65A AND THE COURT FAILED TO EXAMINE THE NATURE OF THE
FEES.
To the extent

that a preliminary

injunction was

verbally

ordered by the trial court, it expired by its own terms after ten
days

or was

continued

by

stipulation.

Whether

stipulated

or

expired, the preliminary injunction did not justify an award of any
fees incurred after that ten day period.
Rule 65A(b)(2) reads in pertinent part:
The order shall expire by its terms within
such time after entry, not to exceed ten days,
as the court fixes, unless within the time so
fixed the order, for good cause shown, is
extended for a like period or unless the party
against whom the order is directed consents

12

that it may be extended for a longer period.
The reasons for the extension shall be entered
of record.
(emphasis added).
More

than

thirteen

(13)

months

of

delay

regarding

the

preliminary injunction hearing occurred due to appellee's delay or
requests for continuance of the hearing.

(R. 1207).

Fees incurred

during that delay should not be awarded as fees in this matter.
In Birch Creek Irrigation Company v. Prothero. 858 P.2d 990
(Utah

1993),

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

addressed

a

similar

circumstances where a hearing on a restraining order was delayed
and

where

the

trial

court

failed

to

comply

with

the

rule's

requirement that "the reasons for the extension shall be entered of
record."

The Prothero Court held that "in light of these failings,

we hold up the temporary restraining order expired by its terms and
is therefore no longer in effect."

Id. at 995.

Accordingly,

Miller and Kimball should not be awarded fees incurred after the
temporary injunction had expired by its own terms.
The trial court also failed to distinguish between allowable
and

non-allowable

fees.

The

trial

court

heard

arguments

and

considered memoranda on many issues other than the request for
preliminary

injunctions.

There was a Motion to Dismiss and a

Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.

There were several new

substantive issues bearing on Appellees1 right to continue with the
foreclosure,
Judgment.

in

light

of

the

events

occurring

after

Default

The trial court improperly lumped all of the attorney's
13

fees incurred for all of these substantive issues as preliminary
injunction fees.

This Court observed in Tholen v. Sandy City, 84 9

P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1993) that the type of legal services for which
attorneys1

fees may be awarded is very narrow.

This Court held

therein:
[4] Although Rule 65A justifies awarding
attorney fees to wrongfully enjoined parties,
those parties are only entitled to "fees . . .
incurred in defending against wrongfully
obtained injunctive relief" and not to fees
incurred in litigating the underlying lawsuit
associated with an injunction.
Saunders v.
Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 933 (Utah App. 1990),
remanded on other
grounds,
806 P.2d 198 (Utah
1991) . See also Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d
968, 969 (Utah App. 1987) (fees incurred
preparing and arguing summary judgment were
not properly awarded because they were not
incurred as a result of the injunction).
Thus, in the present case, Andy is entitled
only to those attorney fees which would not
have been incurred but for the application
for, and the issuance of, the preliminary
injunction.
Fees which would have been
incurred anyway, in the course of proving
Sandy's entitlement to judgment and refuting
Tholenfs defenses, are not recoverable under
Rule 65A. (emphasis added.)
V.
CONCLUSION
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the lower court's
decision denying the Motion to Dismiss, denying the Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment, and the excessive award of attorney's
fees under Rule 65.
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